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Just Put Me to Sleep...PLEASE!
Ethical Issues in Palliative and “Terminal” Sedation
Robert D. Orr, MD
Director of Ethics
University of Vermont College of Medicine
LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS
This article is drawn from a presentation Dr. Orr made at the “Dying Well: Integrating Vision and Hope into Practice”
seminar held at Loma Linda University on March 13, 2002.
I would like to start by drawing a clear, sharp line in the sand. On one side of that line is the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment, such as stopping a ventilator or dialysis, and the withholding of potentially life-prolonging treatment, such as not using
another round of chemotherapy or antibiotics. These are ethically permissible, legally permissible, and professionally sound. On
the other side of that line is assisted suicide, such as the writing of a lethal prescription, and euthanasia, such as giving a lethal injec-
tion. Some people casually and loosely use the term ‘physician-assisted death’ to incorporate all of these entities, but I would like
to assert that there is a sharp distinction.
Let me articulate the distinctions between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the one hand and the decision to forego
treatment on the other. The first difference is intent. The intention of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is death. When the
decision is to forego treatment the intention is to stop prolonging the dying process. There is also a difference in attitude: an attitude
of control in the former and an attitude of humility and resignation in the latter. There is likewise a difference of means. In euthana-
sia and physician-assisted suicide, the means is killing. In the decision to forego treatment, the means is allowing one to die. There is
a difference in agency. In the former, the physician is the agent of death, but in the latter, the disease is the agent of death. Significantly,
there is a difference in morality. From my perspective, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are morally wrong, whereas a deci-
sion to forego treatment is most often morally correct. Depending on the circumstances, even this can be questionable. 
Palliative care and hospice care involve multidimensional care. Attention must be given to the social, psychological, spiritual, and
physical aspects of care. In the physical realm, we clearly need to be experts in treating pain and dyspnea. But, we also need to be
aggressive in giving intensive care for the control of other symptoms. Vomiting is a nuisance, but nausea is terrible in that it goes on
and on, becoming debilitating. Constipation, cough, insomnia, confusion, itching, secretions, dry mouth, halitosis, and other symp-
toms all need our attention.
The two symptoms feared most by those confronting a terminal illness are pain and shortness of breath. Both of them are subjec-
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who do this better than physicians. But, we need to have
somebody there who knows how to do it, knows how to give
medication to treat any anxiety, shortness of breath and so on.
We then remove the endotracheal tube, stop supplemental
oxygen, and stay there. Some physicians get the tube out and
are out the door. But it’s the next several minutes, the next few
hours that are so important. I do not mean we have to stay
there until the patient draws the last breath, because it may
take some time. And, the patient may occasionally survive.
But someone needs to stay there with medication until it is
clear the situation is stable.
What should the physician do when the patient has been
given the maximal treatment and still has unrelieved pain or
dyspnea? I only see three options. (1) Let them suffer, but, it
is immoral to let them suffer. (2) Kill them, but, it is immoral
to kill them. Some people talk about “the right to die.” I put
that in quotations because there is no such thing as a “right to
die.” There is a right to refuse therapy. There is a right to be
left alone. But, there is no “right to die.” Two hundred years
ago, Francis Bacon said to treat the patient’s symptoms not
only that they might recover, “but also when, all hope of recov-
ery gone, it serves only to make a fair and easy passage from
life” (Francis Bacon, 1805). We should treat the symptoms
aggressively with the goal of a fair and easy passage from life.
(3) So, the third option is to knock them out.
This brings me to the concept of “terminal sedation.” I
don’t like the term. I wish we could call it something different.
I wish we could call it “palliative sedation.” The goal is giving
sedation to render the patient unconscious when no other
means will bring the patient relief. The
goal is the relief of suffering, and that is
good. But, the patient may die sooner, and
that is bad. I hope this rings a bell in peo-
ple’s minds, the bell being “The Rule of
Double Effect.” We owe a great debt of
gratitude to Thomas Aquinas from the
13th century who said, “It is morally per-
missible to perform an act that results in
both good and bad effects if all of the fol-
lowing five conditions are met.” (Sulmasy,
D. “The Rule of Double Effect,” Arch.
Intern. Med. 1999, 159:545-50.)
Let us see how this double effect
applies in the situation where we are
increasing the dosage of morphine
knowing that we could potentially sup-
press respiration. Giving morphine for
pain relief is good. The good effect, pain
relief, must not be obtained by the means
FAX: (909) 558-0336
Phone: (909) 558-4956
e-mail: hmorrison@ethicscenter.llu.edu
Website: bioethics.llu.edu
2
Update Volume 18, Number 2
EDITORIAL
ASSOCIATES
G. Gayle Foster
Dustin R. Jones
SCHOLARS
Jack W. Provonsha
Founding Director
Mark F. Carr
Co-director
Ivan T. Blazen
Debra Craig
Steven Hardin
David R. Larson
Richard Rice
James W. Walters
Gerald R. Winslow
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
Heather N. Morrison
GRADUATE
ASSISTANT
Elisha Injeti
ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMMITTEE
Gerald R. Winslow
Chair
Brian Bull
Vice Chair
B. Lyn Behrens
Mark F. Carr
Gerald Ellis
Richard Hart
Joyce Hopp
Odette Johnson
Patricia Johnston
Leroy Leggitt
W. Barton Rippon
Carolyn Thompson
Lois Van Cleve
Letters to the editor and comments may be sent to:
CP 11121S, Loma Linda, California 92350
tive and neither can be measured in frequency or severity.
Sometimes we prescribe morphine or narcotics for pain at the
end of life. But, we need to remember there are a multitude of
pain types and our response should be multifaceted. We must
be aggressive in treating pain.
I spend most of my time doing ethics consultations. Not
infrequently the discussion revolves around whether or not it
is ethically permissible to stop a ventilator on a particular
patient, with the expectation they will not survive. This is a
very important moral and ethical issue. But, once the decision
is made, how it’s done is also a moral issue. I have seen it done
badly and I have seen it done well. When the plan is in place
to stop the machinery, we need to discontinue the monitors
and alarms and move the equipment away from the bed.
Buzzers and whistles sounding off tend to be very disconcert-
ing to the patient and their family. Free up the patient’s hands
by removing restraints. Hands are for holding. Remove any
encumbering or disfiguring devices and take off any dressings
that are not needed. Draw the IV sedation in the room, ready
to give. It is not good enough to have the sedative down the
hall at the nurse’s station or even in the room in a vial.
Sometimes we may want to give some premedication before
withdrawing the ventilator. But, we must have these things
ready beforehand, and then invite the family in should they
choose to be there.
The person responsible, most often the physician, should
be there. We should not merely write an order to have the res-
piratory therapist extubate the patient. There are some nurses
Please turn to page 3
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of the bad effect, an earlier death. So the relief is not obtained
by killing the patient. The bad side effect, the possible earlier
death, must not be intended, only permitted. Even if we can
foresee it or we know it is going to happen, death is not our
intention. There must be a proportionately grave reason for
permitting the bad effect. We would not give increasing doses
of morphine to the point of respiratory depression for some-
body passing a kidney stone. They may be in horrific pain,
but it would not be appropriate to allow them to die of respi-
ratory depression from morphine. There must be no other
way to achieve the good effect. If we can obtain pain relief
through a nerve block or some other mechanism without
causing respiratory depression, then we should do that.
I hasten to add that this discussion and analysis of the “Rule
of Double Effect” in relation to
respiratory depression from mor-
phine is really theoretical. In actu-
ality, pain is an excellent
respiratory stimulant. Thus, if a
patient is still in pain, it is exceed-
ingly unlikely that increasing
doses of morphine in reasonable
steps will lead to an earlier death. I
have given buckets of morphine to
dying patients who were in severe
pain, and can only recall one
patient who I believe died more
quickly from the large doses of
morphine. It hardly ever happens.
A few years ago an interesting
study was conducted by St.
Christopher’s Hospice in
London. This study was
designed because of concerns
that narcotic use at the end-of-life might shorten survival.
The study noted the amount of opioid used in the last week
of life and the implications for end-of-life decision-making
(Thorns and Sykes. Lancet 2000; 356(9227):399). They
looked at 238 consecutive deaths at St. Christopher’s and
recorded the amount of morphine that was used in the last 24
hours. The average was only 26.4 mg, a little more than a mil-
ligram an hour. Those who received opioid increases in their
last 24 hours did not show any shorter survival.
Now, “The Rule of Double Effect” is an agent-justifying
rule, not an action-guiding rule. Its validity depends on the
agent’s intentions. This is very important, as intentions are
within the person. There is no way to look at a person to
know their intentions. But, intentions are practically, morally,
and legally important. The difference between physician-
assisted suicide and withdrawing life support is a matter of
intention at times. And there is a difference between acting,
intending, foreseeing, and desiring. When I am helping to
extubate a patient with the expectation they will not survive,
that is the action. My intention is to stop prolonging the
dying process. I may foresee that they may die more quickly.
They have been so uncomfortable and their family is so
stretched, it seems like it would be a good thing for them to
die. Each of those four things is separate and distinct.
Intention requires intellectual honesty. 
At the same time, we can look at the action and tell a lit-
tle about what the intention is. For example, when we’re
talking about sedation, we titrate to effect. We give a dose
and if that is not adequate, we give some more, and then
more until we have reached the appropriate dosage. The
agents we use may be narcotics,
benzodiazepines, or barbitu-
rates. When somebody is
intending death, they do not
give little bits. They give a
bolus, using agents intended to
cause death, such as potassium
chloride, carbon monoxide, or
other paralytic agents, generally
after some sedation. I refer to
carbon monoxide specifically
because Jack Kevorkian used to
say that he was using carbon
monoxide to relieve suffering or
pain. He said he was operating
under the principle of double
effect. He was not. Maybe he
was deluding himself but he was
clearly not following “The Rule
of Double Effect.” Carbon
monoxide does not work in relieving suffering. Carbon
monoxide causes death. 
Does terminal sedation meet the five conditions of
“Double Effect?” The act of relieving suffering by making
the person unconscious is inherently good. The good effect,
relief of suffering, is not achieved by the bad effect of earlier
death. The bad effect is permitted, but not intended, and is
only done for proportionately grave reasons. There are no
other means to achieve the good effect. It fits.
I can hear some people saying, “But, with terminal seda-
tion the patient dies of starvation and that is awful!” Not
true. When a patient is sedated into unconsciousness, they
do not die of starvation. They die of dehydration, which
actually may be good. It prevents fluid overload, which can
Please turn to page 4
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The Rule of 
Double Effect
• The act must be good in itself,
or at least morally indifferent.
• The good effect must not be
obtained by means of the bad
effect.
• The bad effect must not be
intended, only permitted.
• There must be a proportionately
grave reason for permitting the
bad effect.
• There must be no other way to
achieve the good effect.
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cause respiratory distress. It remains possible to give good
comfort care in the patient who is dying from dehydration. In
a person who is wide-awake, dehydration is not perceived
anywhere in the body except the mouth. And dry mouth is
easily treated with good nursing care.
There is a different kind of suffering for many palliative
care patients. It relates to those who are chronically ill and
slowly dying of progressive neurologic disease, dementia, or
other conditions that cause them concern and fear of what is
in store. They may say they cannot stand the slow pace of
dying and may request terminal sedation. 
My problem with the term “terminal sedation” focuses on
the fact that these are not terminally ill patients who are
imminently dying and requesting sedation for unrelievable
suffering. Their suffering doesn’t emerge from physical
symptoms, but from a fear of death. My concern is that some
people use the concept of terminal sedation with those who
are fearful of death rather than suffering intractable physical
pain. I would really like to keep these two types of suffering
separate and distinct.
The moral and practical distinction is drawn very nicely in
an article in the Journal of Palliative Medicine by James
Hallenbeck (Hallenbeck, J.L. “Terminal Sedation: Ethical
Implications in Different Situations,” Journal of Palliative
Medicine, 2000, 3(3): 313-20). He called them both terminal
sedation. I first saw the term “palliative sedation” in an arti-
Put Me to Sleep…PLEASE! continued… cle written by Robert Kingsbury in the newsletter Dignity,
from the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity (Summer
2001; Vol. 7, no. 2). So we are talking about unrelievable suf-
fering, physical symptoms of pain or dyspnea that support
palliative sedation, which is permissible. When we are talk-
ing about nonphysical suffering of a social, psychological, and
spiritual nature, I think terminal sedation is not permissible. 
Whenever I mention the word “suffering” Eric Cassell
comes to mind. He draws this very important distinction
between pain and suffering. Suffering is often associated
with pain, but they are separate and distinct. People will tol-
erate pain if they know what it is and that it will end. 
Pain of lesser degree may be poorly tolerated if it appears
to be endless, has dire consequences, or is unexplained. (Eric
Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, Oxford University Press, 1991).
H.R. Neibuhr says  suffering “…is the exhibition of the pres-
ence in our existence of that which is not under our control”—
that is when we start to suffer and lose control. Jeffrey L.
Newswanger, in “Ethics and Medicine” (2000), expands that
loss of control to loss of independence and loss of hope. 
Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, has given a
good definition of hope. “Hope is not the conviction that
something will turn out well, but the certainty that something
makes sense, regardless of how it turns out” (Disturbing the
Peace, Vintage Books, 1991). It makes sense. This takes us
back to meaning, to a spiritual issue. I had the privilege
Terminal Sedation: A Jewish Perspective
Rabbi William Cutter, PhD
Professor of Education and Modern Hebrew Literature
Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion
This article is drawn from the panel discussion following Dr. Orr’s presentation at the seminar held at Loma Linda
University on March 13, 2002.
Jewish bioethics deliberation tends to follow a pattern of legal formalism, which calls on classic texts to be applied to contemporary
existential situations. The classic text is often a description of a concrete situation within Jewish lore, and from that situation a principle
may emerge which is then used to help reckon what one ought to do in a present predicament. The “situation in the lore” is usually
matched with a principle, which has also been extrapolated from classic biblical or rabbinic texts. This is how Jewish thought has stayed
relevant in the face of vast technological and sociological shifts. Underlying the methodological formulas has been a principal that I
believe has united the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish practice of bioethics: Our bodies belong to God and it is not our right to do with
them whatever seems convenient at a given moment. Therefore, end-of-life issues are exceedingly weighty and strike at the very the-
ological beliefs of our traditions.
While any of us can read these texts and ponder these issues, we use the word “decisor” to describe the individual within the com-
munity who is responsible  for rendering a more or less official position.
I represent the methodological tendency, and as such I will speak with reference to such significant Jewish thinkers as Elliot Dorff
Please turn to page 8
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any responsible Jewish point of view. But Judaism does endorse
the principle that when there are impediments to death taking
its natural course, we may remove the impediments. Some cyn-
ics have asked the question, “Why is there so much discourse
about this if the answers are so clear cut?” But, what makes the
questions tougher—within mainstream Jewish bioethics—are
the definitions of “impediment” and “natural course.”
The narrative of Rabbi Judah, the great compiler of the
Mishna, is often used by decisors of such issues. It is partly a
homily about the effectiveness of prayer. In the story, the peo-
ple are praying for Rabbi Judah’s life to be extended. God hears
the prayers and they are efficacious. Rabbi Judah does not die.
His handmaid (unnamed) is on the side of the people until she
experiences his suffering, which she notices by evidence that
he visits the privy too frequently.
Finally convinced that his suffer-
ing is too much, she goes to the
roof of the little house and drops
a jar. The sound of the crashing
jar startles the intercessors from
their prayer, and in that split sec-
ond when there is no prayer, God
is distracted (so to speak) and
Rabbi Judah’s soul is able to
depart. This narrative provides
the locus classicus, the basic textual
warrant, for allowing death to
take its course. While we may
chuckle at the telling of this story,
in Judaism we take special joy in
the problem of how to make modern analogies out of very old
stories. 
What are the analogies in the contemporary world? And how
can we move beyond the analogies? In the world of analogy, the
task is to decide whether or not a respirator constitutes the
modern equivalent of prayer in the Rabbi Judah story. This is
especially important given the fact that brain death is more
commonly used as a criterion; but the most conservative Jewish
decisors continue to consider respiration as the criterion.
Perhaps there is an even more appropriate locus classicus. Morris
Abram in his book, The Day is Short, wrote, “In accordance with
the primary obligation of my tradition [Judaism], I choose [life],
embrace it…I am daily reminded of an ancient Hebrew text
that says, ‘The day is short, the work is great…It is not thy duty
to complete the work, but neither art thou free to desist from
it’” (Abram, Morris B. The Day is Short: An Autobiography. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982, 274). In the above
quote from this great Jewish layperson, the argument to
“choose life” can be interpreted to mean that we must keep
and Laurie Zoloth, whose names are mentioned in several con-
texts. I will also suggest that there are other ways in which
Jewish tradition can be utilized in our currently complex “end-
of-life” environment. Some of these other ways have begun by
both Dorff and Zoloth. I will argue that narratives of illness
demonstrate that our current situations are more complex than
most normative ethics situations allow, and that we are thus
obligated to move beyond simple formulas to less grounded
expressions of conscience.
I was moved towards a search for some new method by
philosopher Sydney Hook’s argument in a New York Times
Op/Ed piece some years ago. The article followed his survival
of a cardiac arrest at 83 years of age. He was revived and argued
that, with his children grown and
great pleasure drawn from his
grandchildren, perhaps he should
have been allowed to die. He
explained that his having been
revived meant that he would
have to experience death twice.
On behalf of Jewish tradition, I
question his conclusions in light
of the issues surrounding dying
patients and their care, but I have
to admit that any thoughtful ethi-
cist must reckon with Sydney
Hook’s sense of life and death.
On the “conservative” side of
the ledger, my colleague Laurie
Zoloth does something with my rabbinic students which
demonstrates the complexity of the environment we are in.
She shows them a tape of a man with ALS who is asking for
some kind of intervention to end his life. There is no hope for
longevity; he is in considerable discomfort and is causing a
great deal of turmoil within his home environment. Zoloth’s
effective homiletical trick sets up my students to say: “Well, of
course, let the man go.” She then tells the rest of the story,
including the surprise that within the following week the
patient was feeling better and watching his children play soft-
ball. And yet, it is Zoloth who has paid most attention to the
relationship of end of life issues to public policy realities.
My hope is that we may begin to develop–within Judaism–a
formal way to help people reach a range of choices around each
situation, and perhaps include aspects of the larger context sur-
rounding each issue within our description of the situation.
Judaism is essentially conservative when it comes to end-of-life
issues. As such, the distinction between terminal sedation and
physician-assisted suicide is ambiguous. That is to say, physi-
cian-assisted suicide under any label cannot be permitted by
A Jewish Perspective, continued…
“We may have a 
fundamental 
responsibility to 
determine what God’s
wish might be in a 
spiritual sense.”
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life going at all costs. But, if we view “life” in the broadest
terms possible, then we might include family considerations,
economic status, the needs of the hospital, the social expense
of medical care, and so forth. A patient, in other words, could
choose “life” for his family.
There is a small movement abroad within the Jewish com-
munity to expand the hermeneutic ground to include more
narrative thinking, which means more contextualization of
each individual case; a greater range of possibilities when deci-
sions have to be made; and a greater willingness to overturn
standard methods. These impulses come out of the narrative
tradition, out of contemporary hermeneutics, and from the
prophetic tradition, which operates more vigorously out of a
concern with social welfare and rejection of current norms.
These new approaches could represent a revolution which
would make traditional Jewish decisors uncomfortable; they
may force a change in intellectual discourse and make Jews feel
as if they are following the Protestant non-legal model. Now,
Jews never mind looking Protestant in social terms, but intel-
lectually we pride ourselves in a distinct discourse which I
believe may be coming under some scrutiny.
A Jewish Perspective, continued…
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Terminal Sedation: A Catholic Perspective
James J. Walter, PhD
Director of The Bioethics Institute
Loyola Marymount University
There is no official Roman Catholic teaching on terminal sedation. What you are going to read is a theologian’s idea of how the tra-
dition might think on this topic. I will start with a couple of introductory comments and distinctions as well as the background to this
discussion. Mainly it deals with the nature of suffering and the duty, within the Catholic tradition, to alleviate suffering . Then I will
turn my attention to the two moral issues that are at stake in terminal or palliative sedation. Before you place the patient into a coma,
you have made the decision not to artificially deliver nutrition and hydration, thus allowing the patient to die of dehydration. The other
moral issue follows once the patient is in a coma. I will discuss the ethical dimensions of these two issues and their distinctions. Finally,
I will finish with when I think it is morally permissible or not permissible to perform this procedure, according to the Catholic tradition.
First, I want to make two careful distinctions. The first involves intentions. Terminal sedation generally refers to the intent to end the
life of the patient. In my mind it is very similar to physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Palliative sedation, on the other hand, refers
to the intent from the perspective of the caregiver to relieve refractory pain. Only recently has this distinction entered into the literature.
The second distinction revolves around suffering. There are two types. One is neurophysiological suffering that originates from actual
physical pain. Then there is one I call “agent narrative suffering.” It originates within the alienation of the patient, within the hope-
lessness that the patient experiences, and the burden the patient may feel he or she will impose on their family. How does the Catholic
tradition view suffering? And does the tradition argue within itself a duty on the part of the health-care community to alleviate suffer-
ing when possible? These are important questions. The current Pope, John Paul II, in a speech titled “The Christian Meaning of
This article is drawn from the panel discussion following Dr. Orr’s presentation at the seminar held at Loma Linda
University on March 13, 2002.
So the challenge for Judaism will be to learn to draw on
Jewish sources without seeking out textual warrants in quite
the prescriptive way that has held sway thus far. We live in
communities and therefore an individual’s decision or condi-
tion is contingent on a community. We may have a fundamen-
tal responsibility to determine what God’s wish might be in a
spiritual sense. We may want to consider more communal
precedents. And we may want to re-examine the reading of
some our basic texts in any event.
This is risky business, but a business well worth the risk if
religious thinkers are going to have an influence on practice in
this delicate area as it is experienced in real daily situations. 
Rabbi William Cutter, PhD, is cur-
rently a professor of education and mod-
ern Hebrew literature at Hebrew Union
College, Jewish Institute of Religion, in
Los Angeles. 
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Human Suffering,” (1984) makes a distinction between physi-
cal and moral suffering. He says that this distinction is based on
the double dimension of the human being and indicates the
bodily and the spiritual element as the immediate or direct sub-
ject of suffering. 
Physical suffering relates to the body. Moral suffering relates
to the soul. In one way what the Pope calls moral suffering is
what I call “agent narrative suffering.” Physical suffering from
the Pope’s perspective can have meaning. It is possible to find
meaning and value within suffering when it is experienced in
close connection with love received and love given. It can also
have redemptive meaning in identifying one’s own suffering
with the suffering of Jesus Christ on the cross.
Is there a duty to alleviate pain and suffering? When
physical suffering originates out of pain, it ought to be
relieved if possible. When
patients seek relief, physicians
have a duty to offer painkillers
to alleviate the pain. This is not
just an option; it is a duty for the
physician within the Roman
Catholic community. A docu-
ment was written in 1980, titled
“Declaration on Euthanasia,”
states that “human and
Christian prudence suggest for
the majority of sick people the
use of medicines capable of alle-
viating or suppressing pain,
even though these may cause as
a secondary effect semicon-
sciousness and reduced lucidity.
As for those who are not in a
state to express themselves, one can reasonably presume
that they wish to take these painkillers, and have them
administered according to the doctor’s advice”
<www.cin.org/vatcong/euthanas.html>. This now sets the
stage for the two moral issues before us needing to be
addressed as palliative sedation. 
The first ethical issue is whether to put the patient into a
coma. How would one approach this particular issue
morally? Two Catholic principles may be used to address
these issues. One could use the principle of double effect as
it applies to a specific case. The case is that this is an
instance in which one action produces two results: one good
and one evil. From the Catholic tradition, one must consider
the motive, intention, and means of the individual. The
intention arises from the will. The will targets a specific end
that it wants to achieve. The means are the ways to bring
about the desired end. However, in every action there are
always further consequences: some I foresee and want;
some I foresee, but don’t want; and some I don’t foresee
and, of course, don’t want. 
Henry Ford didn’t invent the internal combustion
engine. What he did do is mass produce automobiles. And
we can assume that what he intended to do, what he wanted
and targeted, was in fact to bring about a machine in a mass
produced way so people could move easily and quickly
about their lives. He created factories in order to produce
this. What moved him to do that? Probably profitability,
among other things. There were a number of consequences
or results of Mr. Ford’s actions, some of which he was aware
of and foresaw and wanted. He certainly foresaw that people
driving automobiles would be able to get where they
wanted quickly. There are other things that he foresaw, but
didn’t want. He surely foresaw
that people were going to kill
one another with this machine.
And presumably, Mr. Ford did
not want that. There are other
things he did not even foresee
with the mass production of
automobiles, and he obviously
did not want them, such as the
amount of pollution that would
occur with this machine. Are we
going to hold him responsible
for everything that occurs as a
consequence?
What types of consequences
am I responsible for, even if I
don’t foresee them? Even when
I don’t want them, can I
attribute them morally to the person doing the action? One
of the problems that can occur within this kind of schema is
the reduction of all of the consequences and the end of the
act into a single category. This category is called “results.” 
This is what the circuit court of appeals did that preceded
the Vacco v. Quill Supreme Court’s decision <supct.law.cor-
nell.edu/supct/html/95-1858.ZS.html>. The second circuit
court of appeals said, “Look, a patient has the right, under
Cruzan, to refuse any treatment even if that results in death.
So, what’s the difference if a physician gives the patient
something that would take their life? The result is the
same.” Here the court simply combines “results.” By doing
that, one does not know what the agent intends and what the
consequences are. 
If you reduce intention and consequence into a single cat-
A Roman Catholic Perspective, continued…
“The principle of 
double effect, along
with the distinction
between ordinary 
and extraordinary
means, in fact, might
justify limited cases of
palliative sedation.”
egory of results, then the second circuit court is absolutely
correct. However, if the distinction between intention and
consequences within terminal sedation is maintained, the
intention of the physician, the target of the will, is to palliate
the patient and free the patient from neurophysiological pain.
The physician uses drugs to accomplish that, with the end of
alleviating the patient’s pain and with the further foreseen,
but unwanted consequence of death of the patient. That
seems to be morally legitimate as long as it can be shown that
the physician has titrated the dosage of the drug, not walked
in and simply given the patient 100 mg of morphine. As long
as the dosage is given over a period of time to control the pain
of the patient, it seems to be an entirely different scenario
from physician-assisted suicide. Although the motive is the
same compassion, the intention is different. In physician-
assisted suicide, the consequence category is the alleviation
of pain, and the death of the patient is the intention. These
two categories get switched between terminal and palliative
sedation.
In the Roman Catholic tradition, these categories are kept
distinct. There is the refusal to elide “end” and “conse-
quence,” what are called effects, one good and one evil. One
of those effects will become the end. The other one will
become the consequence. 
What do you do once you have the patient in the coma?
You have made the moral decision that you will not medically
deliver nutrition and hydration. It makes no sense to place the
patient into a permanent coma and then insert a feeding tube.
recently of sharing the podium with Eric Cassell at a confer-
ence in Rochester, Minnesota. I learned much from him about
suffering. He said, “Suffering is a failure of adaptation.
Suffering starts when the patient is unable to adapt and remain
intact in the face of disease, of treatment, or of the conse-
quences.” He pointed out two important aspects of suffering,
two constant features: the importance of future, and the
importance of meaning. One cannot suffer in the present, as it
relates to the future. And, bodies do not suffer. People suffer.
Bodies have no sense of future and do not assign meaning.
Then he said something that I have thought about as well.
When patients ask for help in dying, they don’t want to die.
Rather they don’t want to live as they are or fear they will be.
What they want is “not this.”
When the patient asks for physician-assisted suicide, we
need to focus on the patient. It is kind of common knee-jerk
practice to tell them, “I’m not allowed to do that. It is against
A Roman Catholic Perspective, continued…
Robert D. Orr, MD, is currently
director of ethics at the University of
Vermont College of Medicine in
Burlington, Vermont. 
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the law.” It is far better to respond, “Things must be awful
or you would not have asked me to do that.” Then probe
for the source of the suffering. How do you probe? By lis-
tening, listening, listening. When you learn of the problem,
you do not have to fix it. You can simply respond, “I under-
stand. We’ll do the best we can. This is you and me
together. We are walking this road together.” That is what
compassion is…to suffer with. 
The Roman Catholic tradition here would use the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means. Ordinary and
extraordinary are not defined by the references used in clini-
cal practice, that is, by reference to what is customary versus
unusual. Rather, these are very carefully defined moral terms
in relating to benefit and burden. Ordinary means are all of
those potential treatments, surgeries, medications, and any-
thing else that could offer the patient a reasonable hope of
benefit, and which can be offered without excessive expense,
pain, or inconvenience. What is expensive, painful and incon-
venient for me may not be for you. This is patient-centered.
There are no absolute standards to determine what is exces-
sively painful, excessively expensive, or excessively inconve-
nient. Notice two conditions have to be met. The treatment
has to offer reasonable hope of benefit, and that it can be
attained without burden. On the other hand, extraordinary
means are all of those potential treatments, surgeries, med-
ications and anything else that could not offer a reasonable
hope of benefit, or could not be obtained without excessive
pain, expense, or other inconvenience. This is always a
patient or family determination after calculating benefit and
burden. The claim might be made that the delivery of nutri-
tion and hydration could be considered extraordinary for a
patient in that it would offer no reasonable hope of benefit, or
it would simply be too burdensome for that patient to accept
treatment given their condition of unrelieved neurophysio-
logical pain.
Please turn to page 12
Goal: Medical science is rapidly advancing knowledge about human genetics. Cloning and stem cell technologies are emerging
that will change the nature of medicine and alter human society. This conference will focus attention on how social policy should
respond to these new technological capabilities. Should the marketplace be allowed to utilize any and all technologies as they
become available? Should government strictly regulate these technologies? What role should religion play in developing social
policy? Furthermore, how can these new technologies be researched and put to use for therapeutic purposes in responsible ways?
Objectives:
Upon completion of this conference attendees will be able to:
* Discuss how these new technologies are developed with concern for bioethics and social policy.
* Identify particular ways that religion can influence the development and use of the new genetics.
* Describe ways in which the therapeutic use of these new technologies can enhance care for patients in a clinical setting.
Target audience:
* Physicians, nurses, social workers, and direct patient care professionals.
* Students and practitioners of bioethics.
* Chaplains involved in caring for patients with genetic emphases.
* Students, lawyers, and politicians interested in social policy.
* Genetic counselors.
* Laboratory professionals in genetics research and practice.
Featured speakers include:
Dede Alpert 
California State Senator, D-San Diego
Chair, California Senate Committee on Genetics, Genetic
Technologies and Public Policy
Kathleen Blazer, CGC
City of Hope Cancer Genetics Education
Diana Fritz Cates, PhD
The University of Iowa
Paul Gelsinger
Father
Ronald Green, PhD
Dartmouth College
Christopher Morris, MD
Pediatrician, Loma Linda University Medical Center
Joan Morris, MD
Pediatrician, Loma Linda University Medical Center
Michael West, PhD, Keynote speaker
CEO, Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.
Tony Zuccarelli, PhD
Loma Linda University
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Announcing the Center for Christian Bioethics 
National Conference in 2003
“Promise and Peril of the New Genetics”
A conference to address developing
social policy and enhancing clinical care
March 2–3, 2003
Books for sale…
Qty
• Abortion: Ethical Issues & Options—edited by David R. Larson ($9.95)
• Remnant & Republic: Adventist Themes for Personal and Social Ethics—
edited by Charles W. Teel Jr. ($9.95)
• The New Relatedness for Man & Woman in Christ: A Mirror of the Divine—by V. Norskov Olsen ($9.95)
• War No More: Options in Nuclear Ethics—edited by James W. Walters ($9.95)
• More Life & Death Decisions—by Robert Orr, et. al. ($9.95)
Videos for sale…
Qty
• A Conversation with Paul Heubach—Four video set, interview by David R. Larson ($34.95) 
• A Conversation with Jack Provonsha—Four video set, interview by David R. Larson ($34.95) 
• A Conversation with Graham Maxwell—Four video set, interview by David R. Larson ($34.95) 
• A Conversation with Harold Shryock—Two video set, interview by David R. Larson ($24.95) 
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Ship to: (Please print)
Name____________________________________________________________________________________________
Address___________________________________________________________________________________________
City, State, ZIP_______________________________________________Phone________________________________
Total Enclosed $_______________
❏ Check ❏ Credit Card (exp date________) ❏ MasterCard ❏ VISA ❏ Discover
Card No._______________________________________ Signature_______________________________________
Shipping ($3 per set) 
Sales tax (California only) 7.75%
Total
Shipping ($3 first book, $.50 each additional book, 
$5 for ten or more books) 
Sales tax (California only) 7.75%
Total
Send payment and list of requested items using this page to:
Heather N. Morrison
Center for Christian Bioethics
Coleman Pavilion, 11121S
Loma Linda, California 92350
The Center for Christian Bioethics has recently formed
a Speakers Bureau to help promote the center and assist
other health-care or educational institutions. The bureau
consists of a number of scholars associated with the center
whose expertise covers a wide range of topics. When
health-care institutions contact the center for help with
arranging ethics committees or with on-going ethics educa-
tion, the Center for Christian Bioethics is prepared to offer
its services. If you or your institution have a need for ethics
education or consulting, please feel free to contact Heather
Morrison at (909) 558-4956.
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Center news…
Center for Christian Bioethics begins new Speakers Bureau
Center for Christian Bioethics holds 11th annual Contributor’s Convocation
The Center for Christian Bioethics hosted its 11th
annual Contributor’s Convocation on November 2, 2002. 
Approximately 60 donors gathered together at
Miramonte Resort in Indian Wells for the day discussing
Adventism, bioethics, and social policy.
The morning began with Pamela Rathbun, MA, assis-
tant chaplain, Loma Linda University, performing a sacred
concert. Charles Scriven, PhD, president of Kettering
College of Medical Arts, Kettering, Ohio, discussed the
importance of character in relation to other qualities of eth-
ical behavior of students attending medical school. 
Following a luncheon on the lawn, Mark Carr, PhD,
MDiv, theological co-director of the Center for Christian
Bioethics, and associate professor of Christian ethics,
Faculty of Religion, shared news, upcoming events, and
goals for the current academic year. 
Charles W. Teel Jr., PhD, professor of religion, La Sierra
University, Riverside, spoke on social ethics in relation to his
book “Remnant and Republic.” Concluding the day, Robert
W. Gardner, PhD, director, office of institutional research,
and professor of social work, Graduate School, spoke of
Adventism’s view and reaction to politics of the day.
The Center for Christian Bioethics is completely
funded by donations and endowment income throughout
the year. For more information on the center, or other ways
to contribute, please contact Heather Morrison at (909)
558-4526.
Charles Scriven, PhD, president of Kettering College of
Medical Arts, Kettering, Ohio, discusses the important of
character in medical students.
Pamela Rathbun, MA, assistant chaplain, Loma Linda
University, and Steve Robertson provide special music
for the convocation. 
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Given those two, I think it is possible to justify limited
cases of palliative sedation, but not terminal sedation. Cases
that are not morally permissible within the Roman Catholic
tradition are as follows: placing patients into a coma that
involves “agent narrative suffering” resulting in hopelessness,
alienation, and so on; and/or when the intention is to end the
life of the patient. Neither of these instances is permissible
and are instances of “terminal sedation.” Cases that might be
morally permissible within the Roman Catholic tradition
involve neurophysiological suffering that give rise to refrac-
tory pain. I have heard that under the most optimal condi-
tions, approximately 5% of dying patients experience
refractory pain. The principle of double effect, along with the
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means, in
fact, might justify limited cases of palliative sedation. 
James J. Walter, PhD, is currently
director of The Bioethics Institute at
Loyola Marymount University in Los
Angeles. 
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